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Abstract
We introduce ‘model migration’ as a species of cross-disciplinary knowledge transfer
whereby the representational function of a model is radically changed to allow
application to a new disciplinary context. Controversies and confusions that often
derive from this phenomenon will be illustrated in the context of econophysics and
phylogeographic linguistics. Migration can be usefully contrasted with concept of
‘imperialism’, that has been influentially discussed in the context of geographical
economics. In particular, imperialism, unlike migration, relies upon extension of
the original model via an expansion of the domain of phenomena it is taken to
adequately described. The success of imperialism thus requires expansion of the
justificatory sanctioning of the original idealising assumptions to a new disciplinary
context. Contrastingly, successful migration involves the radical representational
re-interpretation of the original model, rather than its extension. Migration thus
requires ‘re-sanctioning’ of new ‘counterpart idealisations’ to allow application to
an entirely different class of phenomena. Whereas legitimate scientific imperialism
should be based on the pursuit of some form of ontological unification, no such
requirement is need to legitimate the practice of model migration. The distinction
between migration and imperialism will thus be shown to have significant normative
as well as descriptive value.
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1 Introduction
An interesting and controversial instance of scientific models moving from one discipline
to another is the use of statistical physics models in the context of the economics of wealth
distributions. Kinetic exchange models, originally designed in the context of statistical
mechanics, are used to recover certain ‘stylised facts’ about the distribution of wealth.
Models originally interpreted in terms of exchanges of kinetic energy between molecules
in a gas are reinterpreted in terms of monetary exchanges in an economy.1 Similarly con-
troversial is the use of Bayesian phylogeographic models in historical linguistics. Powerful
computational techniques designed to investigate the origin of virus outbreaks based upon
geographic and molecular sequence data are applied to make inferences about the his-
torical spread of languages.2 Such examples illustrate a phenomenon, which could be
called ‘model migration’, whereby models move from one discipline to another via a rad-
ical change in their representational function.3 Model migration can be contrasted with
what Ma¨ki and Marchionni (2011, 2011), among others, have called ‘imperialism’. The
particular focus of Ma¨ki and Marchionni is on economics imperialism (although various
other cases have been discussed in the literature) and good illustrative examples of the
phenomenon can be found in geographical economics. Imperialism involves an expansion
of the domain of application of models in the ‘imperialistic’ discipline to include target
systems traditionally described by the models of a ‘colonised’ discipline.
In this paper, we argue that migration and imperialism are distinct kinds of cross-
disciplinary knowledge transfer between which it is important to distinguish. Successful
imperialism relies upon justificatory arguments for the legitimacy of essentially the same
1See Chakrabarti et al. (2013) for a comprehensive introduction to ‘kinetic exchange’ models of wealth
distribution. Criticism from the perspective of traditional economics is most piquantly found in Gallegati
et al. (2006). For extensive philosophical discussion see The´bault et al. (2016).
2The particular example we have in mind is application of the techniques of Lemey et al. (2009,
2010) to the problem of the location of the homeland Indo-European languages by Bouckaert et al.
(2012, 2013). For earlier work along related lines see (Gray and Jordan 2000) and the articles in the
collection Forster and Renfrew (2006). See Levinson and Gray (2012) and Gong et al. (2014) for review
articles. Analysis of potential problems with such approaches can be found in Heggarty (2006, 2014),
Mallory (2013). An interesting related controversy is discussed in the exchange between Atkinson (2011,
2012) and critics (Cysouw et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2012; Van Tuyl and Pereltsvaig 2012) regarding the
use of a model of phonemic diversity to argue for an ‘out of Africa’ account of modern languages.
3We should note that, although we do not subscribe to many aspects of his story regarding models in
general, our concept of migration is similar in some respects to Weisberg’s notion of ‘construal change’
in the context of the same ‘model structure’ being borrowed from one ‘modelling domain’ to another –
see in particular Weisberg (2012, p.75-79)). A further related, but much more general, notion found in
the literature is the idea of ‘computational templates’ that travel across disciplines and which can receive
domain-specific modifications (Humphreys 2004). See Marchionni (2013) for an excellent discussion of
computational templates in the context of network science. See §4.1 for dicussions of the relationship be-
tween model migration and the precisification of Humphreys’ idea as ‘model templates’ due to Knuuttila
and Loettgers (2014).
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idealisation, being extended to a wider context. The scope of the model’s ‘sanctioning’
has been expanded; we could say that the ‘certificate of permissible applications’ has
been extended to cover a wider range of circumstances. On the other hand, because
there has been a reinterpretation of the model’s representational function, successful mi-
gration relies upon potentially very different ‘counterpart idealisations’ being justified in
the new context. The model must be ‘re-sanctioned’ in the sense that a new certificate
of permissible applications must be provided. Although superficially similar, migration
and imperialism are substantively different in terms the norms needed for their successful
operation. Misconstrual of a case of migration as a case of imperialism will understand-
ably lead to practitioners ‘talking past each other’. Our binary focus upon migration and
imperialism is driven by the high stakes resting upon the distinction together with the ten-
dency of scientific communities, both in our cases studies and more generally, to conflate
the two. Our core proposal is that by evaluating cases of model migration in terms of the
concept of re-sanctioning, philosophers of science will be well placed to formulate relevant
and useful norms for this important species of cross-disciplinary knowledge transfer. In
particular, engaged critical analysis of idealisations involved in migrant models requires
awareness of modelling practices from both the old and new context. Successful model
migration calls for concerted cross-disciplinary efforts in a manner unlike more traditional
knowledge transfers that operate within one discipline or between adjacent disciplines.
For this reason we believe that migration, and the accompanying re-sanctioning process,
call for a specific cross-disciplinary normative framework. The principal aim of this paper
is to provide such a framework.
In the following section we present our two cases studies of model migration, first
considered separately, in §2.1 and §2.2, and then side-by-side, in §2.3. In the next sec-
tion, we first, in §3.1, offer a short overview of an important case study of imperialism,
geographical economics as discussed by Ma¨ki and Marchionni (2011). and then, in §3.2,
present a summary of the relevant norms of imperialism coming from that discussion.
Next, in §3.3, we consider the contrast between migration and imperialism in detail. A
different comparison is between notions of ‘analogue modelling’ that appear in the phi-
losophy of science literature and our notion of model migration. We will consider the
relationship between model migration and analogue models in §4.1, before developing an
framework for analysing and assessing the general phenomena of model migration in §4.2
and, finally, providing our normative framework in §4.3.
2 Migration: Case Studies
2.1 Econophysics of Wealth Distributions
There is a long list of precedents for models ‘migrating’ from physics to economics. A
particularly strong connection is between the models of statistical physics and those of
financial economics.4 But econophysics is something different. The term econophysics,
describes the ‘...attempts of a number of physicists to model financial and economic
systems using paradigms and tools borrowed from theoretical and statistical physics’
(Stanley and Mantegna 2000, p. 355). What is particularly distinctive about econo-
physics, as opposed to the previous waves of knowledge transfers along the same route, is
4See Mirowski (1992) for a historical review of relationship between physics and economics. See
Weatherall (2013) for a popular introduction to the ‘Physics of Wall street’.
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Figure 1: The DY exchange dynamics (after Chakrabarti et al. [2013], Figure 4.1, p.56)
the degree to which its practice, norms and institutions have remained anchored within
physical science, even as the targets of study have radically changed. That is, econophysi-
cists typically still work in physics departments and publish in physics journals (Gingras
and Schinckus 2012). Philosophical work on the methodological foundations of econo-
physics is fairly limited with a small literature, focusing on financial econophysics, due
to Kuhlmann (2006, 2014), Rickles (2007, 2008), Casini (2014) and Jhun et al. (2017).
In a recent paper, The´bault et al. (2016) provided a philosophical analysis of the ex-
ample of kinetic exchange models of wealth distributions. Here we will briefly consider
the key details of the most basic ‘kinetic exchange’ model of wealth – the ‘DY’ model of
Draˇgulescu and Yakovenko (2000) – in order to illustrate the idea of model migration.
Most, although perhaps not all, of the modelling that goes on in econophysics could be
expected to be described well within the conceptual framework of migration.
Consider the most basic kinetic exchange model of molecules in a gas – that of Boltz-
mann (1872).5 We assume a large but finite number of molecules that undergo binary
dynamical interactions according to a scattering process between ideal hard spheres. The
molecules exchange translational kinetic energy via this scattering and it can be shown
analytically that after some time the velocity distribution will relax to the Maxwell-
Boltzmann exponential form that is found in experiments on real (monoatomic) gasses.
The DY model applies essentially the same line of reasoning to a population of economic
agents, exchanging money via a random trading process. At any given time t an agent
i has associated with them a single property, their money mi(t). For two chosen agents,
the initial pre-interaction state can be characterised completely in terms of two numbers:
mi(t) which is the wealth of agent i at time t; and mj(t) which is the wealth of agent j at
time t. In an agent-agent ‘collision’ all the money of the two agents is pooled, and then a
random fraction is given to one, and the rest to the other. This simple exchange mecha-
nism is shown in Figure 1. A simple analytical argument via maximum entropy reasoning
(Banerjee and Yakovenko 2010) then implies that the stable form of the distribution will
again be of the Maxwell-Boltzmann exponential form, only with the average money per
agent playing the role of temperature. Impressively this model captures the ‘stylised fact’
that the bulk (i.e. bottom 80-90%) of real wealth distributions is of exponential form.6
The DY kinetic exchange model of wealth functions as an exemplar of ‘model mi-
gration’ since it resulted from a radical modification of the representational function of
5See Emch and Liu (2002), Uffink (2014) for detailed discussion and analysis.
6Extending the model to include a ‘savings propensity’ allows one to recover the ‘power-law tail’
distributions also. See Chakrabarti et al. (2013)
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the terms of the Boltzmann kinetic exchange model of gases. The structural form of the
two models is very similar (although not identical), and yet the objects represented are
vastly different: molecules in one case, economic agents in the other. Importantly, such a
structural relationship between models is necessary but not sufficient for a case of model
migration. The concept of model migration involves reference to real scientific practice
within the process of re-interpretation. Migration is, properly speaking, something scien-
tists do with their models in practice, rather than an abstract conceptual relation. That
is, two models may be structurally related but have entirely separate origins. In such cir-
cumstances neither model would have resulted from ‘migration’ and the analysis of their
structural similarity would be an interesting philosophical problem, entirely separate from
our current concerns. Model migration is historically contingent, and intimately tied to
the relevant ‘context of justification’ of the model at the point it is first applied to a new
domain. We shall return to this point later.
2.2 Bayesian Phylogeographic Linguistics
Our second example of model migration also features a model moving from a natural
science context to a social science context. However, this time the relevant model is from
the life sciences, in particular evolutionary biology, and the new modelling context is the
human sciences, in particular historical linguistics. Like with the econophysics example,
we can reasonably take our example to illustrate a wider class of cross-disciplinary mi-
gration patterns. In particular, the movement of models from evolutionary biology to
various social science contexts.
A phylogenetic tree represents the genealogical relationship among species in terms of
a branching structure. Species with more genetic similarity are understood to have had
more recent common ancestors and are therefore represented as closer together on the
tree: they are situated on branches with a common root node. Contemporary biology
makes use of a variety of methods to infer phylogenetic trees based upon observed genetic
data. In Bayesian phylogenetics, trees are reconstructed using molecular sequence data
together with computational techniques, and rules of inductive inference.7 The basic idea
is to model evolution as a stochastic molecular process and use a computer to reconstruct
all the possible historical relationships between species – i.e. the trees – that are consistent
with the observed genetic data – i.e. the branch tips. Bayesian inductive inference can
then be used to calculate a posterior probability for any given phylogenetic tree based
upon the observed data. Thus, using Bayesian phylogenetics we can infer what the most
likely historical relationships are between species based upon the genetic diversity we
observe now.
A more full explanation runs as follows. A phylogenetic model consists of a stochastic
model of genetic evolution via nucleotide substitution and a tree with branch lengths
representing the number of substitutions expected to occur. Nucleotides are organic
molecules that are the sub-units of DNA strands and mutation of DNA is typically via
specific channels for change in the chemical structure of nucleotides. Hence, key features
of genetic evolution can be well described in terms of models of nucleotide substitution.
We feed molecular sequence data into the model and get out posterior probabilities for
different possible phylogenetic trees. Explicitly, the posterior probability for phylogenetic
7See Felsenstein (2004) for a general introduction, Yang and Rannala (2012) for an accessible scientific
review article, and Autzen (2016) for discussion of a fascinating associated philosophical puzzle.
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tree, τi is given by:
f(τi|X ) = f(X |τi)f(τi)∑B(s)
j=i f(X |τj)f(τj)
(1)
where X is observed matrix of aligned DNA sequences; f(X |τi) is the likelihood; f(τi) is
the (assumed to be uninformative) prior; and B(s) is the number of possible trees for s
species. In practice a simple analytic treatment is usually not possible. One problem is
that the likelihood will usually depend upon several unknown parameters. The method
of maximum likelihood estimates these parameters. Moreover, the posterior probability
cannot typically be be calculated analytically. The Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method is thus used to sample phylogenies according to their posterior probabilities.
Bayesian phylogeography involves integrated models based on both molecular sequence
data and spatial location data. The idea is to model the spatial and temporal dynamics
of gene flow, such that posterior probabilities can be estimated for the location of the
root of the relevant phylogenetic tree in both space and time. To do this scientists make
use of Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) models for both genetic evolution and
spatial dispersion of genes. In the model that is the focus of our analysis, Lemey et al.
(2009, 2010) designed a Bayesian phylogeographic model to investigate the origin of virus
outbreaks based upon geographic and molecular sequence data on Avian influenza A-
H5NA and Rabies in Africa. The potential practical importance of such techniques is not
difficult to see. Bayesian phylogeographic techniques provide a tool for us to make infer-
ences about historical patterns of virus outbreaks based upon its current genetic diversity
and spatial distribution. Besides the application of these models in evolutionary biology,
there are natural extensions to closely related areas of the life sciences such as biogeog-
raphy (Ronquist and Sanmart´ın 2011). However, although undoubtedly important and
interesting such ‘intra-disciplinary’ knowledge transfers are not the subject of our current
analysis. Rather, what is particularly remarkable about Bayesian phylogeographic model
of Lemey et al. (2009, 2010) is that it found an almost immediate re-application in an
entirely different context: historical linguistics.
Historical linguistics is the scientific study of written and spoken languages and their
change through time. As such it crosses between formal linguistics, philology, archaeology
and anthropology. One of the most fascinating and long standing questions in historical
linguistics is the origin of the Indo-European language family. The family contains a
vast array of contemporary languages – from Hindi to Irish – and half the people in the
world speak a language from this group. The existence of such familial relationships
between languages spoken in very distant parts of the world has been accepted since the
nineteenth century. The term ‘Indo-European languages’ was coined by Thomas Young
in 1813 and the concept of the family stems from the long observed similarities between
Sanskrit, Latin and Ancient Greek. These similarities were famously described in 1786
by Sir William Jones, an English Judge serving in the Indian high court. He remarked:8
The Sanskrit language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful struc-
ture: more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more
exquisitely refined than either, yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity,
both in the roots of verbs and in the forms of grammar, than could possibly
have been produced by accident; so strong indeed, that no philologer could
8This quote is the rendering of Anthony (2010, p.7) and historical details on the Indo-European
question are taken from both this account and that of Renfrew (1987).
6
examine them all three, without believing them to have sprung from some
common source, which, perhaps, no longer exists.
The precise geographical origin (or ‘homeland’) of the last common ancestor language
of the entire Indo-European family is a matter of ongoing dispute. As is the related
question of the method and date of dispersal. The two major competing hypotheses are:
i) an origin on the Pontic-Caspian Steppe, with dispersal via the domestication of the
horse beginning around six thousand years ago (Gimbutas 1970; Mallory 1989; Anthony
2010) ; or ii) an origin in central eastern Anatolia, with dispersal via the spread of farm-
ing beginning around nine thousand years ago (Renfrew 1987).9 In a controversial and
much reported study, Bouckaert et al. (2012, 2013) adapted the Bayesian phylogenetic
model of Lemey et al. (2009, 2010) in order to evaluate the two competing hypotheses
probabilistically. They used as their input data basic vocabulary terms and geographic
range assignments for 103 ancient and contemporary Indo-European languages. Lan-
guage evolution was modelled via a CTMC as the gain and loss of homologous words –
i.e. cognates like night, nuit, Nacht – through time. The model was tested on the prob-
lem of reconstructing the romance language family, where it gave the (rather reassuring)
location of the relevant ‘homeland’ as Rome. When applied to the Indo-European data,
the model gave very strong probabilistic support for the Anatolian hypothesis over all
other possible homelands, including the Pontic-Caspian Steppe.
We take Bayesian phylogeographic linguistics in general, and the model of Bouckaert
et al. (2012, 2013) in particular, to provide a further vivid exemplification of our notion
of model migration. As with the DY model, we have a case of scientists performing
radical reinterpretation of the representational function of the terms of a model: from
genes to languages, and from nucleotide substitutions to gain and loss of homologous
words. And as in the econophysics case, there is a structural continuity between the
models that persists despite this radical semantic shift. As well as illustrating the positive
and exciting aspects of migration, our two examples have been chosen to exemplify the
general features of the associated controversies. In the next section we will consider the
controversies specific to our two case studies side-by-side.
2.3 Interdisciplinary Indiscipline?
In many key respects the examples discussed in the previous two sections stand as ex-
emplars for the vast array of relevantly similar ‘migrations’ of models from one discipline
to another that have gone on over the last century.10 Our two examples are, however,
particularly controversial: in each case the ‘migrant models’ have been attacked as in
principle inappropriate to the new context. Consider the following:
There is a general (and understandable) tendency on the part of econophysi-
cists to develop theoretical models, which are based on the principles of statis-
tical physics. . . [in general] models constructed on these principles ignore ab-
solutely fundamental features of economic reality. Any congruence obtained
with the data by such models is therefore spurious.
9Here we are following the description of Heggarty (2014).
10This phenomenon has not entirely escaped the philosophical literature, which contains particularly
noteworthy contributions concerning evolutionary biology models migrating into economics (Rice and
Smart 2011), game theory models into biology (Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2011), spin lattices models into neuroscience
(Knuuttila and Loettgers 2014) and ecology models into economics (Weisberg 2012, p.75-79).
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Gallegati et al. (2006, p.4)
...The Indo-European case remains symptomatic of how debates on prehistory,
and on novel methodologies for illuminating it, often fracture along a fault-
line between the natural and social sciences, and between qualitative and
quantitative analyses...divergence (if not change) in our languages is primarily
hostage to, and shaped by, the relationships, contacts and fates of the human
societies and populations that speak them – rather than by culture-blind,
invariant ‘laws of nature’. Many historical linguists thus share with many
historians, archaeologists and anthropologists a reticence to see their object
of study tracked and modelled in quantitative and especially evolutionary
frameworks.
(Heggarty 2014, p.568-9)
In each case closer inspection reveals the general species of problem isolated by the critics:
key idealisations inherited from the original modelling context are inappropriate to the
new context. Practitioners in the new context can take these counterpart idealisations to
be illegitimate, and they are one source of scepticism about the migrating model. What
should philosophers of science make of such inter-disciplinary disputes? Let us return to
our two examples and consider one pair of counterpart idealisations in each case.
In the case of the Boltzmann gas model one crucial idealisation is that interactions
between gas molecules are binary. This assumption is crucial not just to Boltzmann’s
model but to almost all treatments of such systems up to the present day. In the intro-
duction to one of the standard textbooks on the topic we find the authors noting that
‘the legitimate neglect of all but binary encounters in a gas is one of the important sim-
plifications that have enabled the theory of gases to attain its present high development’
(Chapman and Cowling 1991, p.3) What legitimates the binary collision idealisation in
the gas case? A relatively simple answer is found in terms of the density regime of the
gases to which the model is applied. In a very dilute gas we will find on average a van-
ishingly small number of collisions between molecules on reasonable timescales. And in a
very dense gas we will find a non-negligible number of collisions involving three or more
molecules. Between these two regimes there is a ‘Goldilocks zone’ where two-molecule
collisions dominate. As a matter of contingent fact, this is the regime we are interested
in, given terrestrial temperatures, pressures and timescales. Thus, for the target systems
of interest – gases on earth – the binary interaction idealisation of the Boltzmann model
can be justified on the grounds that it is a valid approximation to ‘reality’. The gas
model can thus be ‘sanctioned’ in that it can be provided with a ‘certificate’ specifying
its permissible applications.11 Clearly, however, these grounds for justifying the binary
interaction idealisation and sanctioning the gas model, are irrelevant to the legitimacy
of the counterpart idealisation of binary agential interactions and thus the sanctioning
of the econophysics model. We cannot justify binary interactions in the economic case
by appeal to contingent facts about some analogue of the ‘density regime’ of agents!
So, prima facie, there are reasonable grounds for economists to be concerned about the
legitimacy of the idealisations involved in kinetic exchange models of wealth.12
11Here we are adapting the term from Winsberg (1999).
12See The´bault et al. (2016) for a detailed discussion of the various idealisations involved in the DY
model together with analysis of their legitimacy.
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Phylogenetic approaches in evolutionary biology, including the phylogeographic mod-
els used by Lemey et al. (2009, 2010), are built upon component models of DNA se-
quence evolution in terms of a stochastic process of nucleotide substitution. In this case,
the particular model is called HKY85, after a model used by Hasegawa, Kishino, and
Yano (1985) within which one distinguishes between amplitude of ‘transition’ between
nucleotides of the same molecular structure and ‘transversions’ between nucleotides with
different molecular structure. Clearly much idealisation is involved when the compli-
cated bio-chemical processes behind the mutation of organic molecules is represented via
a stochastic process of substitution. And clearly the bio-chemical justification for the use
of a model of genetic evolution as nucleotide substitution is, again, irrelevant to the justi-
fication for the use of a model of linguistic evolution as gain and loss of cognates, whether
or not these models are formalised in the same way via CTMCs. In fact, Heggarty (2014)
notes that language phylogenies are more reliably established from phonology (sound)
and morphology (word structure) rather than just homology: a particular problem is the
existence of ‘borrowings’ (like the French words in English) that could confound a homol-
ogy based phylogeny – see Heggarty (2006) and Mallory (2013) and for further critical
comments.
Thus we again see that there are prima facie plausible reasons for doubting the validity
of results produced from migrant models. Practitioners of traditional approaches are not
simply acting as reactionaries (or inter-disciplinary xenophobes!); at least on a general
level, their reasons for worrying are well justified.13 How should practitioners of migra-
tory modelling respond to these criticism? Are there general morals about the process
justifying counterpart idealisations that we can draw? We will return to these question
in the final section of this paper. Before then, by way of offering a contrast class, we will
consider a very different, and also controversial, movement of models between disciplines,
that have been categorised in the literature under the name of ‘imperialism’.
3 Imperialism
3.1 Geographical Economics
Geographical economists are interested in the geographical or spatial distribution of var-
ious kinds of entities at various scales: ‘industry clusters, core-periphery patterns among
countries and regions, cities and systems of cities, patterns of international trade and spe-
cialization, and the causes of economic growth and development.’ (Ma¨ki and Marchionni
(2011, p.192)) Geographical Economics (GeoEcon) explains this variety of phenomena by
considering the behaviour of economic actors optimising given constraints of wage com-
petition and transportation costs. Essentially, GeoEcon treats the decision of where to
base your business as a trade-off between two factors: transportation costs and increased
competition. Locating near your consumers reduces transportation costs. However, lo-
cating near your consumers likely means locating near your competitors as well. Such
increased competition will drive up your costs and drive down your prices. Various kinds
of distribution patterns of industries are then taken to be explained by the interplay
between these factors. When transportation costs are high, the advantage of being near
your customers likely outweighs the increased costs due to extra competition and thus
13It is here, perhaps, that our politically inspired terminology becomes most misleading. Within
mainstream political discourse at least, well reasoned and justified criticism of migration is invariably
conspicuous by its absence. See Dummett (2001) for an excellent discussion.
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‘agglomeration’ is more likely. Contrastingly, when transportation costs are low, moving
out of town is not as much of a disadvantage, and thus the balance is tipped in favour of
locating away from your competitors to reduce competition.
Consider a simple economy where there are two types of industry – farming and
manufacturing – and two geographical regions – North and South.14 Farmers are tied
to their fields, so their locations are fixed, but the manufacturers can choose where to
locate their factories. The manufacturers sell to farmers and to other manufacturers.
There are costs for transporting goods to the region the factory is not located in. Thus,
other things being equal, the manufacturers prefer to locate in the region where they
sell more goods: this reduces their transport costs and thus increases their profits. One
starting point for the GeoEcon model is that, other things being equal, the decision of
where to locate depends on transportation costs. But other things are not equal: if a
company locates its factory in a region where there are already many factories, there
is competition for workers, which drives up wages, which drives up costs, which drive
down profits. Locating where there is little competition for workers – and thus where
wages are lower – might compensate for higher transportation costs. This is the other
main piece of the puzzle: the decision of where to locate depends on wage competition.
Both drivers of the model – transportation costs and wage competition – depend on
the location of the other economic actors. When it is better for the firm to locate near
other factories to reduce transportation costs and to accept higher wage bills as a result,
then the firms will agglomerate. The demand for jobs will drive migration towards the
agglomeration (which, incidentally drives down wages through competition). This is
the putative explanation provided by Geographical Economics for the genesis of cities.
People tend to cluster when transportation costs give them an incentive to locate near
their suppliers and customers: when increased competition (due to nearby competitors)
is outweighed by lower transportation costs.
Geographical Economics aims to offer an explanation of why people cluster in cities
in terms of a purely economic decision. In doing so it treats humans making decisions
as to where to live as highly idealised economic agents. The decision making process is
one that consists in the constrained optimisation of a very sparse set of considerations.
Despite its attractive simplicity, this GeoEcon explanation clearly fails to account for
various sociological and socio-psychological reasons that influence people’s choices to live
close together rather than spread evenly across the countryside. It is for this reason that
GeoEcon is cast as an unwarranted colonisation of a long standing and central topic in
the human sciences. In particular, GeoEcon ignores a number of important explanatory
factors studied by anthropologists, human geographers, sociologists and even network
scientists.15 GeoEcon is imperialistic because it treats those agents who decide where
to establish their business as agents of the same kind as those studied in other areas of
economics. GeoEcon effects an increase in the scope of economics, by explaining a class
of phenomena that were not originally thought of as purely economic phenomena, using
the theories and techniques of economics only.
14 Our presentation follows Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk (2009), chapter 3
15The list of relevant literature is vast. See for example (Weber 1958; Carter and Donald 1993;
Portugali 2012).
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3.2 Norms of Imperialism
Ma¨ki and Marchionni (2009, 2011, 2011) see GeoEcon as part of a general push to explain
as much as possible from an economic perspective. This idea of the ever-increasing scope
of economic methodology has been called ‘economics imperialism’. In these papers, and
elsewhere (Ma¨ki 2013), Ma¨ki adopts a nuanced view of when economics imperialism
(and other science imperialisms) can be beneficial.16 Others have been more critical of
imperialism. John Dupre´, in particular, has been critical of (among other things) rational
choice theory as a science of human nature. According to Dupre´ it is illegitimate to treat
humans as always behaving like economic agents, and the drive to do so is a pernicious
form of imperialism.
...typical imperialists do not merely establish embassies in foreign countries
and offer advice to indigenous populations. And similarly, economic impe-
rialists do not merely export a few tentative hypotheses into the fields they
invade, but introduce an entire methodology and one that is in many cases al-
most entirely inappropriate. Here I mean by ‘methodology’ two things: first,
a set of core assumptions about how to conceive of the phenomenon under
investigation, in this case human behaviour; and second, a methodology in
the strict sense of a style of scientific argument.
(Dupre´ 2001, p.128)
The analogy to political imperialism is made even more explicit by Clarke and Walsh:
Colonised disciplines accept and attempt to apply the methodologies of the
invading discipline on the grounds that these have proved to be fruitful else-
where. In doing so they fail to appreciate that such methodologies bring with
them a way of approaching their subject matter that sheds light on some
aspects of the subject of study but obscures others. Valuable ‘indigenous
knowledge’ that might otherwise be gained, may be overlooked and valuable
indigenous knowledge that has already been gained may be lost, when a suc-
cessful instance of scientific colonisation takes place, or so the opponent of
scientific imperialism can argue.
(Clarke and Walsh 2009, p.202)
In contrast, to such critical appraisals of imperialism, some – most notably Lazear (2000)
– have been happy to accept that a tendency towards imperialism can be a successful
and worthwhile feature of a discipline. In particular, Lazear argues that the incursions
into neighbouring disciplines that economists have made in the past half century have
had predominantly positive effects on those areas of knowledge.
Although evocative and in many ways insightful, ultimately the analogy between
political and disciplinary imperialism may serve to obfuscate as much as illuminate. In
particular, it does not seem reasonable to cast disciplinary imperialism as in principle
illegitimate, but rather to see it as a phenomenon that can be practiced to to the mutual
benefit of all, given appropriate norms.17 Plausible examples of such norms are provided
16See also Fumagalli (2017).
17For this reason it might be argued the terminology of ‘imperialism’ is unhelpful. Although Ma¨ki
and Marchionni may not have had such an intention, the word imperialism has an unavoidable pejora-
tive connotation in modern English, not least through the deep political connections between political
imperialism and ethno-national chauvinism.
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by Ma¨ki (2013) in terms of constraints on the pursuit of explanatory unification across
disciplinary boundaries. We will discuss three of Ma¨ki’s four constraints here as they
will prove important in our contrastive analysis in the context of the norms of migration
discussed in §4.3.18
Ma¨ki’s first constraint relates to ontological unification of the diverse phenomena
found in the imperialistic and colonised discipline.
The pursuit of unification in its ontological mode is a legitimate process of
discovery of the extent to which there is unity in the world itself: the extent
to which parts of the world are made of similar components, governed by
similar laws, or generated by similar causal mechanisms, and so on...the first
constraint on scientific imperialism is that it should be based on the pursuit
of ontological unification (Ma¨ki 2013, p.336)
The contrast between Ma¨ki’s first norm of imperialism, regarding ontological unification,
and what we present as the first norm of migration (§4.3), regarding re-sanctioning, will
prove highly instructive.
Ma¨ki’s second constraint for imperialism is essentially a norm of epistemic humility.
The basic, and very reasonable, idea is that ‘epistemic caution is advisable when accept-
ing and rejecting theories and explanations both on the home grounds of a discipline
and in far away territories’ (p.336) which implies, more prescriptively, that ‘[a]ny im-
perialistic claims about the cross-disciplinary unity of phenomena must be accompanied
by explicitly stated careful provisos rather than hidden uncertainties’ (p.337). The final
constraint on imperialism (Ma¨ki’s fourth) that is relevant to our comparison, then relates
to institutional practice:
The pursuit of cross-disciplinary unification should proceed under the guid-
ance of the rules and regulations of appropriately virtuous scientific practice.
Imperialism that proceeds by engaging in open debate and by spelling out
and defending its presuppositional posits is more acceptable than imperialism
that succeeds merely or mostly by relying on the academic and non-academic
standing of the imperialistic discipline.
In §4.3 we will see that the norms of imperialism implicit in Ma¨ki’s epistemic and insti-
tutional constraints have natural parallels in the norms of migration.
3.3 Imperialism and Migration
There are some obvious similarities between what we called ‘model migration’ and ‘scien-
tific imperialism’. Both essentially involve interdisciplinary transfer of knowledge: some
aspect of a theory in one domain – the original disciplinary context – is brought to bear
on scientific problems in another area of inquiry – the new disciplinary context. Both
kinds of interdisciplinary knowledge transfer are often resented by practitioners in the new
disciplinary context, and often for similar reasons: work of this kind is not sufficiently
responsive to or respectful of the ‘indigenous knowledge’ of the new disciplinary context.
This notwithstanding, there are important contrasts between migration and imperialism
18Ma¨ki’s third constraint – his ‘axiological’ constraint – is basically that the success of a scientific
endeavour is judged in terms of its importance; and importance is relative to human needs and values.
This seems to be true of all scientific endeavours, rather than just those that fall under the scope of
imperialsim.
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that should not be overlooked. In particular, although migration and imperialism both
involve models ‘moving’ from one discipline to another discipline, imperialism is unlike
migration since it can be adequately understood in terms of an increase in scope of the
domain of validity of the original model.
In discussing GeoEcon, Ma¨ki and Marchionni emphasise that GeoEcon represents a
kind of ‘explanatory unification’ whereby phenomena that were not previously explained
in economic terms come to be explained in the same way as other economic explananda.
Here it is useful to differentiate between derivational and ontological unification: the for-
mer involves several phenomena being explained by the same kind of mathematical model,
the latter involves several phenomena being explained by the same kind of underlying
causal structure. According to Ma¨ki and Marchionni, successful instances of imperial-
ism often involve both: they are ‘motivated by ontology, facilitated by mathematics’
(Ma¨ki and Marchionni 2009, p.10). In the GeoEcon example, whereas the mathematics
of constrained optimisation provides the derivational unification of spatial distribution of
companies with other economic phenomena, the idea that companies act like constrained
optimisers provides the ontological unification. Let us put to one side these notions of
‘ontological unification’ and ‘derivational unification’ and also questions of explanation.19
For our purposes the important point is that on the Ma¨ki and Marchionni account, suc-
cessful imperialism relies upon exploiting an ontology that is shared (or at least similar)
between the new and old disciplinary contexts. Contrastingly, migration, unlike imperi-
alism, does not rely upon a shared ontology in any significant sense. Econophysicists do
not think that agents in an economy and gas molecules have ontological features in com-
mon. Nor do scientists appealing to Bayesian phylogenetic linguistics think that words
and genes share an ontology. In each case the claim is only that very different systems
can be effectively modelled via structurally similar equations. The important distinction
for our purposes is that imperialism involves assuming that the same kind of thing is hap-
pening in two apparently distinct domains because of some similarity in the underlying
ontology : the agglomeration of people into cities is driven by purely economic motives
and thus economic theory applies. Migration, on the other hand, makes no assumption
about ontology, it just involves the recognition that an abstract model can be fruitfully
applied in another sphere.
A small detour into counterfactual history of science will help illustrate the distinction
between migration and imperialism further. Fresnel’s wave theory of light postulated
a luminiferous ether: a fluid through which light waves travel as surface waves travel
through water or sound wave travel through air. This was very natural since the concept
of a wave was, at that time, necessarily connected to the idea of a disturbance in a
medium. If light travelling through space was to be a wave, then there must be an
as yet undetected medium that occupied all of space. The real history of this episode
could be used to illustrate (intra-disciplinary) imperialism. Fresnel took a model of the
dynamics of waves in a conventional fluid medium, and applied it in a new domain, a
domain he thought was ontologically similar: in both cases we are dealing with waves
moving through a fluid. In fact, by modern scientific lights, there is no such thing as the
luminiferous ether. Thus, counterfactually, Fresnel’s wave theory of light could have been
arrived at as a case of model migration. In our alternative scenario Fresnel’s model is
derived without belief in an ontological similarity between light waves and conventional
19Neither explanation nor unification are our focus here. Rather our aim is to emphasise the difference
between migration and imperialism and we can do this without considering vexed questions of explanation
or relying upon Ma¨ki and Marchionni’s two kinds of unification.
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fluid waves but rather via a radical reinterpretation of the intended domain of the existent
fluid wave models. Whether the norms of imperialism or migration ought to apply in this
case depends on what Fresnel thought he was doing and how he justified it.
For the purposes of our present analysis, we are interested in the methodology of
science as done by scientists, so what is important is not whether there is genuinely a
shared ontology between two uses of the same model. Rather, what matters to us is
whether or not the modellers in question believe there is a shared ontology.20 Fresnel,
if he thought he was simply extending the fluid mechanical theory of waves to a new
kind of fluid, should be considered as engaging in imperialism and be governed by its
norms. If instead Fresnel had not been thinking in terms of a fluid ether, but was rather
using a model coming from fluid mechanics to explain what he took to be the sui generis
phenomena of light, then he should be judged by the standards of the norms of model
migration. The question of whether or not there ‘really is’ a luminiferous ether is simply
beside the point in establishing whether or not Fresnel was justified in adopting his chosen
modelling strategy. In this sense we are internalist about the justification of modelling
practice.
In a similar vein, consider Hotelling’s model of the location of firms and its appli-
cation to the political spectrum (Hotelling 1929). Consider a beach with people evenly
distributed along it. Where should an ice cream stand locate itself? Imagine that there
are two ice cream stands located one third and two thirds of the way along the beach.
Each beachgoer wants to travel the minimum distance to buy ice cream: the differences
between the stocks of the two vans doesn’t matter to the consumers, only their location.
Each van gets about half the beachgoers coming to their van. If a van were to locate
itself dead centre, it would get more than half the custom: all the people from one side,
and half of the people between that van and the other van. So each van has an incentive
to move towards the middle. The same model has been used to explain why politicians
have an incentive to move towards the middle of the ‘political spectrum’. Is this imperi-
alism or model migration? The first thing to say is that a one-dimensional beach is an
abstract representation of a physical system, while a one-dimensional political spectrum
is an abstract representation of something that is, itself pretty abstract. So are the two
models ontologically similar or not? This is an interesting question but not the relevant
one to our task at hand. Rather, the question is did they modelling practitioners who first
extended the model from the first context to the second rely upon ontological similarities
to justify counter-part idealisations within the new modelling context? If yes, then an
analysis based upon imperialism would be more appropriate. If no, then ideas from model
migration (or perhaps analogue modelling see §4.1) would be more appropriate.21
The contrast between imperialism and migration must be understood as between two
different things that scientists do with their models in practice, rather than between two
distinct abstract ahistorical conceptual relations.
20We accept that how much ontological similarity the scientists themselves see might be vague, or a
matter of degree in practice.
21In actual fact, Hotelling himself pointed out the political application of his model from the outset –
thus neither framework is entirely appropriate.
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4 Migration: Morals
4.1 Migration and Analogy
The goal of the paper thus far has been to explicate our notion of model migration by
way of two case studies together with the comparison with imperialism. The last section
has, we hope, established that migration and imperialism are different types of knowledge
transfers, with different accompanying methodological issues. In this section we will make
the further comparison between model migration and ‘analogue models’. Our aim will
be to highlight important differences between migration and analogy, whilst also noting
useful connections that can be drawn between our notion of migration and the existent
analogue models literature.
Analogical inferences play an important role in science and the topic has been fairly
extensively discussed in a literature that features work by Keynes (1921), Hesse (1964,
1966), Bailer-Jones (2009) and Bartha (2010, 2013). A focus of much work in the topic
is upon the heuristic role that analogies to another area of science can play in the con-
struction of models. In this sense analogical connections are typically forward looking
statement regarding potential heuristics for model development: they provide ‘cognitive
strategies for creative discovery’ (Bailer-Jones 2009, p.56). Often scientists use the anal-
ogy between two systems as a heuristic to construct a model of one, partially based upon
the model of the other.
An important distinction, due to Hesse (1964), is between ‘material analogies’ due
to relevant similarity of properties between two systems, and ‘formal analogies’ when
two systems are both ‘interpretations of the same formal calculus’ (Frigg and Hartmann
2012). Crucially, in both cases, the analogical relationship holds between the target sys-
tems in question, rather than models which are understood to represent these systems
in some restricted domain of validity. Our notion of model migration does not in prin-
ciple depend upon any analogy (material or formal) between target systems existing. It
is a phenomenon built upon historical relationships at the level of the models, rather
than analogical relationships at the level of target systems. Model migration can and
does operate under conditions of extremely weak or non-existent analogy between target
systems. We take our case studies to illustrate this point rather clearly.22
That said, it is reasonable to understand analogy as an important component in many
instances of model migration. This point is made particularly clear in the excellent dis-
cussion of evolutionary biology models being imported into economics provided by Rice
and Smart (2011). Rice and Smart discuss two distinct ways in which analogies with
biological evolution have been used to construct models in economics. One type is when
similarities between concepts used to model two types of systems (biological and eco-
nomic) are exploited for the purpose of economic modelling. This fits very well with the
traditional notion of an analogue model a` la Hesse. Rice and Smart, however, also discuss
another type of ‘analogue modelling’ within which the formal structure of specific mod-
els developed within evolutionary biology is adapted for use in economics. This type of
analogue modelling is similar to model migration in that it also involves reinterpretation
of the representational function of a model from one domain to another. In the examples
22There is, of course, in some sense, an analogy between particle collisions and money transfers, as
there is between genetic evolution and language evolution. However, appeal to such weak analogies would
be to put ourselves in danger of trivialising the concept: after all everything is analogous to everything
else, in some sense.
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considered by Rice and Smart it is, however, still based around structural relationships
between the target systems, over and above those between the models. In particular, in
the example they consider, the key feature behind the successful analogue modelling is
taken (by the modellers) to be that the the biological and socio-economic target systems
in question contain elements that are interrelated within a similar structure. It is plausi-
bly only such structural relationship between systems that allow for analogue modelling
in this sense. By contrast, the target systems described by a model and its migrant coun-
terpart need not contain elements that are interrelated within a similar structure. Thus,
Rice and Smart’s framework is too restrictive to encompass model migration as we have
defined it.
A further related framework is provided by Knuuttila and Loettgers (2014) in the
context of application of the Ising model in both condensed matter systems (in terms of
the Sherrington-Kirkpatrick model of spin glasses) and neural systems (in terms of the
Hopfield model of associative memory). Drawing upon Humphreys’ (2004) notions of
computational and theoretical templates they develop the idea of a ‘model template’ as
a multiply applicable conceptual and mathematical tool:
The notion of a model template aims to capture the intertwinement of a
mathematical structure and associated computational tools with theoretical
concepts that, taken together, depict a general mechanism that is potentially
applicable to any subject or field displaying particular patterns of interaction.
(Knuuttila and Loettgers 2014, p.295)
In the case of the Ising model the relevant ‘patterns of interaction’ relate to general
cooperative mechanisms leading to collective phenomena. This constitutes precisely the
specification of the structural relationships between the target systems that Rice and
Smart seem to have in mind in their dicussions of analogue modelling based around formal
structure. We can thus introduce a third species of analogical relationship, grouping
together the examples that Rice and Smart, and Knuuttila and Loettgers consider. These
are ‘structural analogies’, due to relevant similarity of ‘patterns of interaction’ between
two systems. This is in keeping with Hesse’s distincion between ‘material analogies’ due
to relevant similarity of properties between two systems, and ‘formal analogies’ when two
systems are both ‘interpretations of the same formal calculus’.
As already emphasised above, our notion of model migration does not in principle de-
pend upon any substantive analogy between target systems existing. It is a phenomenon
built upon historical relationships at the level of the models, rather than analogical re-
lationships at the level of target systems; it is about what modellers think, not directly
about how things are in the world. This applies equally to structural analogies as it does
to material and formal analogies. Moreover, whilst it is most certainly true that most
(if not all) examples of analogue models built upon structural analogies would count as
examples of model migration, the converse relationship, prima facie, does not hold. For
instance, it is not clear that either of our two case studies could plausibly be understood
as examples of analogue modelling based upon structural analogy. Any argument to this
effect would require a great deal of articulation of a relevant non-trivial sense of ‘struc-
tural relationship’ between genes and words, and molecules and people. Moreover, on
our view, articulating such a relationship for these particular models would be simply
beside the point so far as re-sanctioning is concerned. Whilst structural relationships
between target systems may be relevant to the ‘context of discovery’ of migrant models,
they are not, in any general sense, relevant to the ‘context of justification’. The next
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Figure 2: Schematic Representation of Model Migration.
section will make clear why we think it is important to make this distinction between the
methodological practice of modelling and the conceptual relations among models.
4.2 Re-Sanctioning
Let us consider the key features of the phenomenon of migration at an abstract level of de-
scription and introduce a symbolic representation to aid clarity.23 In a given disciplinary
context, for certain purposes and to a certain degree of desired accuracy, a modelling
framework M1 is adequate for modelling a target system T1 within a certain domain of
conditions D1. Furthermore, we understand that certain terms within M1 adequately
represent features of T1 within the domain of conditions D1. These claims of adequacy
are based upon the fact that although such a representation relation may involve ide-
alisations (possibly gross idealisations), justificatory arguments have been provided for
the legitimacy of these idealisation within the domain of conditions. In this sense M1
has been sanctioned. Model migration involves reinterpretation of the model, along with
appropriate modification, leading us from M1 to M2. M2 is then a modelling framework
operating in a different disciplinary context, that is claimed to be adequate for modelling
a target system T2 within a certain domain of conditions D2. Furthermore, it is claimed
that certain terms within M2 adequately represent features of T2 within the domain of
conditions D2. A schematic digram of the situation is given in Figure 2. The question
at dispute is the adequacy of M2 for modelling (and representing) T2. And the principal
concern is that the justificatory arguments provided for the legitimacy of the idealisations
involved in the application of M1 within D1, are unconnected to the legitimacy of relevant
counterpart idealisations involved in the application of M2 within D2.
Let us consider our two case studies once more starting with the kinetic exchange
models of gases and wealth distributions. One of the idealisations of the gas model was
that all collisions are binary. The justificatory argument for the legitimacy of this ide-
alisation is its approximate truth within the density regime in which the model is being
applied. In this regard, the model has been sanctioned. The counterpart idealisations in
23Here we are adapting terminology previously used to analyse cases of computer simulation (Winsberg
(2009, 2010)) and analogue simulation (Dardashti et al. 2015).
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the wealth model is that agential interactions are binary. The original justificatory argu-
ment clearly cannot migrate alongside the model since it is not reasonable to talk about
‘density regimes’ of agents in the relevant modelling context. However, this does not
mean that kinetic exchange models of wealth must in principle be taken as illegitimate.
Rather, new, context-specific justificatory arguments must be provided to legitimate the
counterpart idealisation, and thus support the claim of adequacy of the model within
a given domain of conditions. The model must be re-sanctioned. One plausible such
argument, that could be given in the new context, but not the old, is the idea of decom-
position.24 Perhaps many-agent economic interactions can be legitimately decomposed
into a series of two-agent interactions? If we can think of complicated multi-agent mone-
tary exchanges as concatenations of two-agent interactions then the relevant idealisation
can be legitimated, and the model re-sanctioned. Whether or not this particular strategy
works, clearly the binary exchanges assumption for the wealth model will require a rad-
ically different justification from its gas counterpart. The binary exchange idealisation
is not illegitimate in the new modelling context simply because it cannot be justified in
the same way as in the old modelling context. This is the essential, and rather straight-
forward, idea behind re-sanctioning.25
An arguably more successful example of re-sanctioning is our second case study:
Bayesian phylogeographic models of genetic and language evolution. As discussed above,
one of the key idealisations in the genetic model is the use of probabilistic models of
nucleotide substitution as representations of the process of genetic mutation. Like in the
gas case, clearly the justificatory arguments for the legitimacy of this idealisation in the
original disciplinary context will not be applicable in the new disciplinary context. More-
over, there is a clear mismatch between the real process of language evolution, that in-
volves changes in phonology and morphology, and the process represented in the Bayesian
phylogeographic model of Bouckaert et al. (2012, 2013), that only involves changes in ho-
mology. The particular problem is that the existence of ‘borrowings’ between languages
that may confound any phylogeny based purely upon changes in homology. Thus, the
idealisation appears at first hand to be illegitimate. In fact, Bouckaert et al. (2012,
2013), were fully aware of this problem, and as well as pruning their database to remove
known instances of borrowings, they did simulations to show that their analysis is reliable
provided the levels of borrowings are not too high. Thus, new justificatory arguments
were provided to legitimate this particular counterpart idealisation, and re-sanction their
migrant model. Importantly, the validity of this re-sanctioning has been accepted even
by critically minded historical linguists such as Heggarty.26 The relevant re-sanctioning
has even been used to advocate against reactionary tendencies and towards integration
of the new modelling techniques within existing disciplinary practice:
Bouckaert et al. (2012, 2013) have taken pains to address many of the
doubts raised, by thoroughly expanding, revising and correcting the language
24In fact, the idea of justifying binary interaction via decomposition is entirely inappropriate to the
gas context since the dynamical equation governing gas molecules are generically chaotic for three or
more molecules.
25As would be expected, the ‘analogue species’ of migrant model discussed by Rice and Smart would
also require re-sanctioning. See in particular Rice and Smart (2011, pp. 671-2). The most vivid example
provided is from Rosenberg (1994), whose argument (in our terminology) is that although the idealisation
of infinite population sizes can be legitimated in an biological context, the counterpart idealisation,
involved in application of the relevant migrant models in economics, is illegitimate.
26Contrast in particular, the attitude taken in (Heggarty 2006) with that in (Heggarty 2014).
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database used, and exploring a range of alternative data-sets, phylogenies,
models, parameters and constraints, including those advocated by supporters
of the Steppe hypothesis. Yet across all of these permutations, the results
consistently and strongly favour a homeland in Anatolia instead...Bayesian
phylogenetics is unquestionably opening up provocative new perspectives to
advance both the Indo-European debate, and the wider endeavour of which
it is a part: the search for how best to harness the rich data that lie in the
very languages we speak, to tie them in with and complement the genetic and
archaeological records of our origins.
Heggarty (2014, pp.576-6)
Such successful re-sanctioning is likely to be in part due to the fact that Bouckaert et
al. (2012, 2013) are a multi-disciplinary team including practitioners trained in tradi-
tional historical linguistics. Conversely, even the economists who were the most ardent
critics of kinetic exchange models of wealth failed to isolate arguably the most crucial
re-sanctioning problem: that of binary interactions.27 Engaged critical analysis of ideal-
isations involved in migrant models requires awareness of modelling practices from both
the old and new context. Successful model migration calls for concerted cross-disciplinary
efforts in a manner unlike more traditional knowledge transfers that operate within one
discipline or between adjacent disciplines. For this reason we believe that migration, and
the accompanying re-sanctioning process, call for a specific normative framework. We
hope that the following section will go some way towards providing such a framework.
4.3 Norms of Migration
In many senses model migration is a heterogeneous phenomenon and as such the dangers
of suggesting general morals for its good practice should be clear. This notwithstanding,
we think there are four generally applicable principles that practitioners would do well
to heed.
First, and foremost, is the basic message of re-sanctioning. It will, in general, be rare
for justificatory arguments for idealising assumptions to migrate alongside the relevant
models. This places a clear duty of good practice on scientists to devote resources to iso-
lating and justifying counterpart idealisations. Re-sanctioning can be a subtle business,
but without it inferences based upon migrant models are on shaky foundations. Second,
conversely, although counterpart idealisations do need justification, the mere fact that
they are in general unlikely to inherit such justification from the old modelling context
does not make them illegitimate in principle. Scientists sceptical of the use of migrant
models in the new disciplinary context should thus reserve judgment until after a process
of re-sanctioning has been attempted. Third, it is often a difficult task for scientists
trained in the old disciplinary context to appreciate the subtle, and sometimes implicit,
modelling practices of a new disciplinary context. It is thus important for re-sanctioning
to involve, as much as is possible, dialogue between the researchers employing the mi-
grant models and practitioners with training in the new disciplinary context. Fourth, we
are not advocating in principle primacy of the existing modelling practices. Sometimes
there may be good reasons for the researchers employing the migrant models to ignore
27 In fairness, the reason for this is probably because it is an assumption that is common in mainstream
economics as well.
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key elements of standard modelling practice in the new disciplinary context. For one
thing, practitioners trained in the new context will often lack awareness of the modelling
practices of the old context. This means they may not even fully appreciate what the
relevant counterpart idealisations are. Moreover, migration often occurs into disciplines
that hitherto lacked sophisticated quantitative machinery, and thus existent methods of
evaluating modelling practices may be simply in appropriate. Such considerations do not,
however, mitigate the duty of re-sanctioning. They only make it even more subtle.
It is useful to contrast our first two norms of migration with the ‘ontological con-
straint’ proposed by Ma¨ki in the context of imperialism. The ontological constraint
constitutes a prescription that legitimate scientific imperialism should be based on the
pursuit of ontological unification. Our first two norms taken together imply almost the
exact opposite with regard to migration. Legitimate model migration is not required to be
based upon any form of ontological relationships at the level the target systems. Rather,
re-sanctioning may involve entirely new justificatory arguments for the re-interpreted ide-
alising assumptions. It is for precisely this reason that the conflation of cases of migration
with cases of imperialism is particularly dangerous and problematic. Applying well rea-
soned prescriptions for successful imperialism, such as Ma¨ki’s ontological constraint, may
explicitly conflict with norms for successful migration. Thus, sensitivity to the distinction
is important for practitioners not just philosophers. Contrastingly, our third norm and
fourth norms are very similar in spirit to Ma¨ki’s epistemic and institutional constraints,
although more specialised to the particular features of migration as opposed to imperi-
alism. There are clearly general morals for interdisciplinary model transfers that apply
across the spectrum of migrant, imperialist and analogical models.
Let us now consider our morals for migration in the context of our two cases studies.
We take it to be uncontroversial that econophysicsts generally lack awareness and/or re-
spect for economics modelling practices; and that economists are almost entirely ignorant
of the modelling practices of physics. This is a far from ideal situation for both parties.
More work in the service of re-sanctioning the models of econophysics would bring both
better integration with existing economic work and fuller appreciation of precisely which
features of the models would be best to focus de-idealisation strategies upon (for ex-
ample, how best to improve the ‘realism’ of the kinetic exchange model by making the
agents more sophisticated). That said, the modelling practices involved in much existent
economic work are disputed on a number of fronts, and the empirical support that the dis-
cipline enjoys might charitably be called sparse. Thus, in line with our fourth moral, we
are not advocating assimilation of econophysics into the existing paradigms of economics.
Rather we suggest an increase in engagement, and in particular collaboration between
the econophysicsts and traditional economists. Our second case study from Bayesian
phylogeographic linguistics illustrates the benefits of such an approach particularly well.
Just as lack of collaboration makes re-sanctioning more difficult than it should be in the
case of econophysics, in Bayesian Phylogeographic Linguistics we see that collaboration
between people trained in both disciplines has led to better informed discourse and more
effective re-sanctioning.
There are huge potential benefits for the disciplines that encourage successful mi-
gration. For example, both historical linguistics and economics lack reliably established
quantitative modelling frameworks suited to answering the kind of questions that the rel-
evant migrant models address. Migration of models into these disciplines from the natural
sciences in this sense supplies new, and arguably much needed, tools. In linguistics, the
role of the Bayesian phylogeographic model of Indo-European languages is that of under-
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determination breaking: providing a supplementary analytic tool to help choose between
competing hypothesis. In economics the problem of recovering the functional form of
wealth distributions is a long outstanding one. The tools of traditional economics are
largely unsuccessful in recovering these features. That the econophysics models are being
operated using idealisations without adequate justificatory support does not eliminate
their superiority in this regard. Rather the onus is upon economists and econophysicsts
to combine their efforts towards the re-sanctioning of kinetic exchange models of wealth.28
5 Conclusion
The conceptual and rhetorical framework of imperialism is not appropriate to many im-
portant examples of inter-disciplinary knowledge transfer. Our two case studies from
econophysics and Bayesian phylogeographic linguistics illustrate this point well: the con-
troversy within these cases is nothing to do with scientists trying to subsume economic
systems into the realm of physics, or the evolution of languages into evolutionary biology.
Rather, we believe that such cases can be understood within the conceptual framework
of model migration and re-sanctioning. We believe that there is much valuable work
for philosophers of science to do in exploring more cases studies from this perspective.
In particular, in the context of model migration, philosophers will find a valuable roles
both as mediators in disputes between practitioners trained in the old and new modelling
contexts and as advocates for increased cross-disciplinary work, when and where it is
needed.
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